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Abstract 
 
This article offers an analysis of the cooperation between the EU and the 
U.S. on customs security in the context of the two actors’ fight against 
terrorism. While other aspects of the EU-U.S. counterterrorism 
cooperation have received some scholarly attention, not so much research 
has focused on security cooperation in the EU-U.S. customs and supply 
chain. To investigate the emergence of transatlantic cooperation in this 
field this article employs regime theory in examining the 2004 EU-U.S. 
customs security agreement, the 2012 EU-U.S. mutual recognition 
decision, and the transatlantic disagreement on the U.S. 100% scanning 
rule. 
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Introduction  
 
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, cooperation 
between the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) on 
counterterrorism expanded significantly with the negotiation and 
conclusion of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreements, the mutual 
legal assistance and extradition agreements, the Europol-U.S. 
agreements, the Eurojust-U.S. agreement, and the EU-U.S. agreements 
in the area of customs and supply chain security. This article focuses on 
the area of customs security, which has received less scholarly attention 
compared with the case of the PNR agreements;1 and it seeks to examine 
the question of how the two sides’ cooperation emerged in this policy 
field. 
 
This question is important given that it touches upon both the security 
and the economic aspects of the EU-U.S. relationship. The EU and the 
U.S. economies account for almost a third of world trade flows.2 A large 
part of this trade is conducted through the transatlantic shipping line with 
maritime cargo vessels; in 2001 the container traffic between Europe and 
the U.S. amounted to 5.1 million containers while in 2006 this number 
rose to 6.1 million containers.3 Less than two percent of these containers 
were inspected for security purposes.4 This was one of the customs 
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security gaps that officials from both the EU and the U.S. identified after 
the 9/11 attacks. 
 
Moreover, given the large volume of containerized transatlantic trade, 
customs security measures related to cargos could potentially impede this 
trade. Such was the case, for example, of the U.S. 100% scanning rule 
which, according to the EU, would, if implemented, affect EU-U.S. trade 
negatively. Additionally, failure of the two parties to agree on common 
security standards for international supply chains would increase the costs 
for companies and, as a result, for transatlantic trade.  
 
 
This article employs regime theory to trace the negotiation and conclusion 
of two EU-U.S. agreements on customs security (the EU-U.S. 2004 
customs security agreement and the 2012 mutual recognition decision) 
and to analyze the transatlantic conflict over the 100% scanning rule. The 
focus of regime theory on international cooperation means that this 
theoretical approach can provide insights into the emergence of 
transatlantic customs security cooperation. The EU-U.S. negotiations and 
discussions are conceptualized as a regime formation process in which the 
two sides sought to establish the rules for their customs security 
cooperation; the social factors of power, interests, and knowledge, as well 
as contextual factors and exogenous events, are hypothesized to have 
played a role in this process. The data for this article was collected from 
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secondary sources and media sources (through Nexis news database) and 
from six semi-structured elite interviews. 
 
It is shown in this article that transatlantic customs cooperation emerged 
only after the 9/11 attacks. In the context of the changed security 
environment, the EU and the U.S. perceived international supply chains as 
particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. It is also argued that the 
transatlantic customs security regime was not a purely U.S.-imposed 
regime: the EU-U.S. customs security cooperation was rather based on 
common interests, and it was akin to a process of institutional bargaining 
in which all factors (power, interests, and knowledge) played a role. 
Additionally, while literature on EU-U.S. counterterrorism relations often 
presents the EU as a reactive and passive actor5, this article presents the 
argument that the EU took a proactive role in several instances. 
One of the main themes that emerge from the examination of 
transatlantic cooperation on customs security is that while the EU and the 
U.S. did not have significant differences on the required security 
measures, they clashed over the issue of the form that transatlantic 
cooperation would take. On the one hand, the U.S. initially demonstrated 
a desire to work separately with individual member states rather than 
with the EU. On the other hand, the EU insisted that any cooperation on 
customs security should be based at and start from the EU level. Using 
regime theory this article shows how this difference was resolved and how 
the EU managed to change U.S. calculations.  
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In the next section the topic of regime formation is discussed. The article 
continues with a presentation of the context of the EU-U.S. customs 
security relations and an examination of the two agreements of 2004 and 
2012 and the 100% scanning issue. Finally, the article concludes with a 
discussion of the findings from the three cases examined. 
 
Theories of international regimes 
 
The most famous definition of regimes came from Stephen Krasner in 
what was named in the literature the “consensus definition” of regimes: 
“regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.”6 Krasner’s definition 
has been one of the most widely used definitions and researchers 
continue to employ it for analyzing international cooperation.7 
 
Given the above definition, the EU-U.S. customs security cooperation is 
conceptualized in this article as a regional transatlantic regime in the 
issue-area of customs security. There are three customs security 
principles around which the EU and the U.S. have converged: multi-
layered risk management, international cooperation, and trade 
facilitation.8 These principles were incorporated into the EU-U.S. 2004 
agreement, the 2011 EU-U.S. joint statement on supply chain security, 
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and the 2012 mutual recognition decision. The customs security norms 
that were established included the obligation of the two parties to share 
and exchange best practices and information, to develop common security 
standards, and to coordinate their positions in international forums.9 
Further, more specific rules began to emerge over time, such as those 
related to the implementation of the mutual recognition decision. Finally, 
the decision-making procedures of the regime include the Joint Customs 
Cooperation Committee (JCCC), the Transport Security Group, and the 
customs security working groups established through the EU-U.S. 
agreements. Decisions in these groups take place through the exchange 
of views and joint deliberation with the aim of reaching consensus.10  
 
The presence of a nascent EU-U.S. customs security regime raises the 
question of how this regime was established and what the regime 
formation process reveals about the EU-U.S. relationship. Regime 
theorists approached the issue of regime formation through three main 
theoretical approaches, a power-based, an interest-based, and a 
knowledge-based.11 Initially regime theorists relied predominantly on 
single-variable analyses of regime formation. At a later stage however 
scholars argued in favor of synthetic models of regime formation which 
included all three variables of power, interests, and knowledge; such a 
synthetic model is used in this article. 
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This article uses Oran Young’s taxonomy of political leadership12 as well 
as the synthetic model of regime formation proposed by Oran Young and 
Gail Osherenko, according to which the social forces of power, interests, 
and knowledge “feed into a process of institutional bargaining.”13 In the 
case examined in this article, the additional cross-cutting factors of 
leadership and context direct or channel the operation of these social 
forces.14 The participants in this model can be state actors as well non-
state actors (for instance, international organizations, international non-
governmental organizations, and private companies). 
 
In Young’s model, leadership can take three forms. Structural leaders are 
negotiators who translate power in the sense of material resources into 
bargaining leverage during the negotiations.15 Entrepreneurial leaders 
devise innovative and mutually-acceptable deals, set the agenda, and 
popularize the issue under question.16 Finally, intellectual leaders 
disseminate knowledge to policymakers and negotiators in order to 
change the perceptions of the negotiating parties regarding the problems 
at stake.17 
 
In this article the negotiations between the EU and the U.S. are 
conceptualized as a bargaining process for the establishment of a nascent 
regime. It is expected that the social forces of power, interests, and 
knowledge would influence this process, which can be divided into the two 
stages of agenda setting and negotiations.18  
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 According to the power-based approach, the EU and the U.S. would seek 
to impose their preferences through sanctions and coercion, and the 
negotiators would exercise structural leadership.19 According to the 
interest-based approach, the EU and the U.S. would initiate negotiations 
voluntarily to realize joint benefits, and the agreements would reflect both 
sides’ concerns. The negotiators would influence each other through side-
payments and compensations and they would thus devise equitable 
results (entrepreneurial leadership).20 Finally, according to the 
knowledge-based approach consensual knowledge regarding the suitable 
response to customs security problems would be the catalyst and driver 
of the EU-U.S. cooperation.21 The EU and the U.S. would change their 
interests or/and their means to pursue these interests under the influence 
of new knowledge about the broader political and social environment or 
about the problems at stake.22 Negotiators and officials would 
disseminate new ideas, thus exercising intellectual leadership.23  
 
Moreover, contextual factors are expected to have influenced the regime 
formation process.24 These factors range from global events and crises to 
domestic and national developments and events. Finally, interaction 
effects between the three social forces of the model presented here are 
expected to have been present during the negotiations: power can be 
used for devising equitable results, ideas can be used tactically for the 
advance of certain interests and positions, power can be used for the 
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imposition of rules reflecting certain ideas, and knowledge can shape the 
way interests are defined and/or means are chosen.25  
 
In the next sections, an analysis of the emergence of the EU-U.S. 
customs security regime is undertaken, using the above regime formation 
model. This model, which focuses on the role of power, interests, 
knowledge, and contextual factors, will be applied to the negotiations for 
the 2004 and 2012 agreements and to the transatlantic conflict over the 
100% scanning rule. 
 
The context: customs security before and after the 9/11 attacks  
 
Customs security before the 9/11 attacks 
Before the 9/11 attacks the anti-terrorism aspect of customs security was 
not considered a high-priority area; rather, the efforts of customs 
authorities were focused on counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling 
activities. The threat of terrorist use of the international supply chains did 
not loom large given that there was not any precedent for such an 
attack.26 The terrorist attacks against the marine transportation system 
had mainly been of the cruise/ferry vessel-bombing or cruise/ferry vessel-
hijacking kind.27  
 
As a result, only a miniscule percentage of containers were inspected28-
less than two percent of cargo containers-29and little advance information 
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on the content of cargos was available when shipments were arriving at 
U.S. ports.30 The cargo vessels were required to file vessel manifests 
concerning the content of the cargo only forty-eight hours before the 
arrival of the vessels at a U.S. port,31 and the decision on whether a 
shipment was legitimate was taken only on the basis of the requisite 
documentation. This approach was not very reliable since the documents-
related requirements were nominal; the shippers, for example, were not 
required to identify the originator or the recipient of the shipments or to 
itemize the contents of the cargo.32 Additionally, the rationale behind 
cargo inspections was the collection of customs duties, and in the balance 
between trade facilitation and trade security the emphasis was clearly on 
the trade facilitation aspect of customs.33  
 
In conclusion, the prevalent characteristic of supply chain security at that 
period was the “almost complete absence of any security oversight in the 
loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final 
destination.”34 After the 9/11 attacks the 9/11 Commission Report 
highlighted this absence of security controls in the customs and cargo 
sector and urged the government to take drastic action in order to reduce 
the vulnerabilities in this area.35 
 
Similarly to the U.S., before 9/11 the use of the international supply 
chains for terrorist purposes was not considered as a threat by either the 
EU or its member states. Rather, the focus was on the fight against 
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customs fraud and customs law infringements and on the smuggling of 
prohibited goods (such as drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, and 
endangered species goods).36 This focus can be seen for example in the 
1998 “Naples II Convention on Customs Cooperation.”37 
 
Given that neither the EU nor the U.S. viewed the terrorist exploitation of 
supply chains as a high risk threat, no initiatives were taken by either side 
towards transatlantic cooperation in this field. The result of this lack of 
political prioritization was that a customs security regime formation 
process did not start prior to 9/11.   
 
Customs security after the 9/11 attacks 
 
The altered security environment after the 9/11 attacks spurred a 
learning process both in Europe and the U.S., in which the priorities and 
the threat perceptions of both the U.S. and the EU changed. While the 
9/11 attacks were related to aviation security rather than to maritime 
security, they nonetheless prompted security officials on both sides of the 
Atlantic to assess a multitude of scenarios and attempt to identify and 
plug security gaps across numerous areas. Concerning the U.S., the 
international supply chains of goods were seen not only as an essential 
part of U.S. trade, but also as a potential security liability, in the sense 
that terrorists could exploit the maritime trade system and use it as a 
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means to execute their plans. Similar threat perceptions were prevalent in 
the EU after the 9/11 attacks.38 
 
In particular, policymakers were concerned about a number of threats 
that could materialize in the uncertain post-9/11 security environment. 
Firstly, the containers that arrived at ports could contain conventional 
explosive devices or materials related to weapons of mass destruction 
that could be used for terrorist attacks (such as chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear agents).39 Additionally, the international supply 
chain could be used for the smuggling of persons (terrorist organizations’ 
operatives) into U.S. or European territory. Secondly, sea containers 
could conceal explosive devices, including “dirty bombs” (radiological 
dispersal devices), programmed to set off or be remotely detonated when 
the vessels containing the containers arrived at their destinations.40 
Alternatively, terrorists could use a cargo ship’s legitimate load (such as 
chemicals, petroleum, and liquefied natural gas) as the means to conduct 
an attack. Thirdly, significant costs and disruption would be caused not 
only in the case of an actual attack but also in the case of a credible 
threat of an explosive device.  
 
U.S. and EU strategic documents and policy papers during this time 
period reflected the above threat perceptions. On December 2002 the 
U.S. Coast Guard adopted its maritime strategy for homeland security, in 
which the threat emanating from a possible exploitation of the U.S. 
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marine transportation system for terrorist purposes was highlighted.41 
The EU’s policy and strategic documents similarly reflected the new threat 
perceptions. For instance, in the maritime transport security 
communication of the Commission it was highlighted that any ship could 
be used as means for terrorist attacks, and that this threat made a focus 
on maritime security necessary.42 In a similar vein, the Council resolution 
of 2003 on a strategy for customs cooperation identified terrorist and 
organized crime attacks against supply chains as one of the main threats 
to the EU’s safety and security.43 
 
To sum up, this section examined how customs security was 
conceptualized before and after the 9/11 attacks. Given that the terrorist 
threat against containers was not identified as a problem by either side no 
regime was formed prior to 9/11.  
 
The Container Security Initiative and the 2004 EU-U.S. customs 
security agreement  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the role of knowledge, as 
a social factor influencing regime formation, was prominent in two senses. 
Firstly, as a result of the changed threat perceptions mentioned 
previously, customs functions in the U.S. were re-conceptualized in terms 
of the new emergency stemming from the fight against terrorism. The 
new security environment together with a new set of perceived threats 
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prompted the U.S. to give an anti-terrorist mission and role to customs. 
Secondly, apart from this re-conceptualization, U.S. security officials and 
practitioners also converged around the concept of “smart borders;”44 
these officials held the professional belief that applying this new idea 
about border controls to the customs area was the best solution to the 
customs security gaps identified.45  
 
The above indicates that a learning process took place wherein the U.S. 
redefined its interests under the influence of new knowledge about the 
country’s security environment and about the optimal U.S. response. At 
the heart of this process was a U.S. group of security professionals, 
experts, and policymakers which included officials from the U.S. Customs 
Service and from other organizations such as the U.S. Coast Guard and 
the U.S. Border Patrol, and members of the academic and scientific 
community.46 The object of this group was to reduce uncertainty for the 
U.S. administration in the face of this new threat environment.  Firstly, it 
promoted the idea of treating the area of customs as a predominantly 
anti-terrorist and security-oriented space and, secondly, it incorporated 
customs functions into the broader homeland security plan of creating 
smart borders. 
 
As a response to the customs security vulnerabilities mentioned 
previously, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Unit 
established a plan based on five pillars: (1) the use of advance 
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information, (2) the use of automated risk targeting, (3) the use of 
sophisticated detection technology at ports of entry, (4) the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI), and (5) the launch and expansion of C-TPAT 
(Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism).  
 
This five pillar system was part of the broader U.S. homeland security 
strategy and in particular of the U.S. plan for the establishment of “smart 
borders” which appeared in the first U.S. strategy for homeland security 
in 2002.47 In the latter it was envisioned that the “border of the future” 
would be a continuum framed by land, sea, and air and built upon 
concentric circles of defense.48 In this layered approach to border controls 
the first line of defense would be overseas. When people or goods passed 
through the various layers the relevant U.S. security bodies would screen 
and filter these people and goods with the help of risk management 
techniques.  
 
The application of the smart borders concept into the customs area meant 
in practice that the U.S. customs security functions would be “exported” 
and take place abroad.49 In other words, functions like the collection of 
information regarding the content of cargos and the screening and 
inspection of containers would take place overseas rather than at the U.S. 
ports of arrival.  
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The Container Security Initiative together with the 24-hour advance 
vessel manifest rule (24h rule) were two of the measures that were 
introduced by the U.S. Customs for the implementation of the smart 
borders plan into the customs area. Through these measures the U.S. 
initiated a customs security regime formation process: having been the 
recent victim of terrorist attacks, it was the U.S. that moved first to shape 
the security agenda. With these initiatives, the U.S. officials exercised all 
forms of leadership (structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual). The role 
of knowledge was evident in the fact that the U.S. customs security rules 
were based on the idea and conceptual framework of smart borders; in 
this sense the U.S. officials were trying to shape the “intellectual 
capital”50 of its partners and allies. At the same time, the unilateral 
imposition of the extraterritorial 24h rule, accompanied by penalties for 
non-complying shippers, was an exercise in structural leadership where 
the U.S. officials deployed threats in order to ensure the compliance of 
third actors. Finally, entrepreneurial leadership was evident in the 
promotion of the CSI program, which depended on the consent and active 
involvement of third countries; the U.S. made an effort to popularize and 
draw attention to the CSI, and it also offered a number of side-payments 
and benefits to the countries as well as to the ports that would participate 
in the program.  
 
The CSI was initiated in January 2002 and it concerned the foreign ports 
from which shippers exported goods to the U.S.  The CSI had the 
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following elements: (1) shippers would provide advance information about 
the content of the containers before the cargo vessel left the port of 
origin, (2) U.S. Customs would establish risk criteria and risk indicators to 
enable the identification of the containers that posed the greater risk, (3) 
containers would be pre-screened at the ports of origin (rather than at the 
U.S. ports of arrival), on the basis of the cargo information given in 
advance and on the basis of the risk criteria mentioned previously, and 
(4) technology would facilitate the scanning of high risk containers and 
the development and use of “smart” containers.51  
 
For the implementation of the CSI, U.S. Customs planned to sign 
agreements firstly with the ports and governments that were sending the 
highest volume of cargo traffic to the U.S.52 U.S. Customs officials would 
be placed in these ports in order to pre-screen the containers; in case the 
U.S. customs agents thought that a container needed further inspection 
they would instruct local customs authorities to conduct a physical or 
other inspection.53 This was a highly significant aspect of the CSI program 
because it touched upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty; the U.S. 
was requesting through this feature of the CSI that a country cede part of 
its sovereignty by allowing U.S. customs officials to be stationed on its 
soil.54  
 
The benefit that the U.S. offered to these ports was that the containers 
which originated from the CSI ports would have expedited clearance 
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through U.S. customs.55 Additionally, the countries that participated in 
the CSI could also station customs officials in U.S. ports. In other words, 
the U.S. tried to achieve the compliance of other actors through the 
provision of compensations and rewards. The ports that participated in 
the CSI would become more competitive and this would also economically 
benefit the countries in which these ports were based. 
 
The 24h rule, which was related to the CSI, emerged with the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002.56 This document legislated that 
information about inbound containers should be provided in advance, that 
is before the arrival of cargos at the U.S. ports. The 24h rule became 
compulsory for third parties through the U.S. legislation on October 2002. 
The CSI, which was initiated on January 2002, was however a voluntary 
program and the U.S. depended on co-operation with third countries on 
this issue given that the CSI included the stationing of U.S. Customs 
officials on the soil of third parties.57 Therefore, the U.S. approached a 
number of EU member states in order to gain their approval for the CSI, 
in this way stimulating the demand for a customs security regime; the 
ultimate aim of the U.S. was to sign with these member states 
“declarations of understandings” which would incorporate these countries’ 
ports into the CSI.58 It was through these two movements, on the one 
hand the unilateral legislation of the 24h rule and on the other hand the 
entrepreneurial promotion of the CSI, that customs security emerged in 
the EU-U.S. agenda. Both initiatives were based on and backed by the 
 19 
 
intellectual underpinnings of the smart borders concept, pointing to the 
existence of interaction effects between the social factors of knowledge on 
the one hand and power and interests on the other hand. 
 
During this agenda formation stage, the U.S. adopted an approach based 
on bilateralism and on approaching individual member states rather than 
the EU institutions. In its interactions with member states the U.S. acted 
as a “champion”59 of the CSI, drawing attention to the problem of supply 
chain security and at the same time shaping the way this problem was 
framed for discussion. The entrepreneurial leadership of the U.S. officials 
was indeed successful, and by September 2002 Belgium, Netherlands, 
Germany, and France signed memorandums of understanding with the 
U.S. regarding the implementation of the CSI at five ports (Rotterdam, 
Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremerhaven, and Le Havre).60 By January 2003 
Spain, Britain, and Italy followed.61 
 
The reason for this bilateral approach lay in the fact that there was a 
genuine atmosphere of urgency at that time, and the U.S. officials 
believed that starting negotiations with the EU, which was perceived as a 
slow-moving and cumbersome organization, would take too much time. 
Approaching member states individually was perceived as more 
expedient.62 The U.S. Customs spokesman justified the U.S. approach 
saying that the CSI was an issue of national security and therefore 
Washington did not “have the luxury of time”.63  
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On their part, the countries that signed memorandums with the U.S. were 
motivated by economic and trade concerns;64 in other words, the 
entrepreneurial efforts of the U.S. officials were successful. In particular, 
these countries were afraid that if they did not implement the CSI, their 
ports would be perceived as less safe than ports with CSI status.65 The 
shippers would choose the safer option of moving their goods through CSI 
ports and this would result in economic losses for the ports that were not 
part of the U.S. program. Therefore, the response of the member states 
to the U.S. initiative was generally positive.66  
 
Similarly, European shippers and ports were generally supportive of the 
CSI though there were concerns about the uneven application of CSI 
standards to European ports.67 Regarding the 24h rule, shipping 
companies were more critical, noting that this rule might entail economic 
costs for the private sector.68 The ports and the shippers did not, 
however, initiate any serious opposition to the U.S. measures given the 
U.S. determination to implement its customs security programs without 
any delays.  
 
In terms of the regime formation process, the entrepreneurial initiatives 
of the U.S. officials were an example of the interest-based accounts of 
regime emergence which highlight the importance of side-payments and 
common interests. At the same time, the U.S. officials disseminated 
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through their contacts with ports and member states officials the 
principles of risk management and trade facilitation. Additionally, these 
first U.S. initiatives show the importance of the negotiation arithmetic and 
the potential influence of private actors in the regime formation 
processes. Regarding the first, Young has stressed that the identity of 
participants in institutional bargaining is often fluid and a matter of 
bargaining in itself; indeed the initial effort of the U.S. to override the EU 
created strong resistance by the latter, as will be demonstrated 
subsequently. Finally, the involvement of private actors (shippers and 
ports) in the customs security measures discussed highlights the growing 
importance of private actors for international regimes and for security 
governance.69 
 
The U.S. initiatives generated mixed feelings in the European 
Commission. On the one hand, the Commission accepted and approved 
the ideas that formed the basis of the U.S. customs security measures.70 
These ideas and principles included the advance provision of cargo 
information and the establishment of risk management techniques for the 
pre-screening of containers. On the other hand, the Commission had 
strong disagreements with the U.S. preference for concluding separate 
deals with European states. The Commission’s position was that for both 
legal and efficiency-related reasons an EU-U.S. agreement was 
necessary.71 This disagreement about the form that transatlantic customs 
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cooperation would take and about the role of the EU in the CSI was the 
main issue of contention between the Commission and the U.S.72  
 
With regard to the first issue, the European Commission did not have any 
significant objection to the actual content of the U.S. measures;73 from 
the perspective of the Commission officials the U.S. initiatives “made 
sense” in the context of the post-9/11 security environment.74 This 
European acceptance of the U.S. customs security program, rather than 
resulting from a process of mere U.S. imposition, points towards a 
process of imitation. Indeed, the Commission’s reforms regarding EU’s 
own customs security system were to some extent based on the U.S. 
plans for customs security mentioned previously.75 The Commission saw 
the value in the U.S. supply chain security program and benefited from 
the experience of the U.S., which moved first in this area.76 
 
Concerning the second issue, the fact that the Commission embraced the 
U.S. principles on customs security did not lead automatically to the 
emergence of an EU-U.S. regime. Rather, the initial preference of the U.S. 
was to conclude deals with individual member states rather than with the 
EU. This initial difference confirms Young’s remark that in processes of 
regime formation the identity of participants is often fluid and a matter of 
negotiations in itself.77  
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The European Commission opposed the bilateral deals of the U.S. and 
proposed instead the negotiation and conclusion of an EU-U.S. agreement 
on customs security which would include the expansion of the CSI at all 
EU ports. The Commission’s argument against the U.S. bilateralism was 
that the EU’s common internal market and common customs area were 
affected by the U.S. memorandums with member states. The containers 
that were shipped from EU’s CSI ports would have preferential treatment 
in the U.S. ports compared to the cargo shipments coming from EU’s non-
CSI ports; this in turn gave an advantage to certain EU ports and it 
created as a result distortions in the function of the EU internal market.78  
 
The main aim of the Commission was therefore to transform the bilateral 
approach that the U.S. was following into an EU-U.S. regime formation 
process.79 Exploratory talks between the Commission and the U.S. started 
in July 2002 and during these talks as well as during the subsequent 
negotiations the Commission had a strong strategic position that 
stemmed from the fact that customs issues were part of the first pillar of 
the EU. On first pillar issues the Commission had strong competencies 
and the European Court of Justice played a greater role;80 for customs 
agreements with third countries in particular it was the Commission that 
had the competency to negotiate and conclude such agreements. In other 
words, the bilateral approach of the U.S. clashed with the EU acquis and 
the fact that member states did not have the competency to negotiate 
customs agreements.81  
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The Commission used a number of tactics in order to make the U.S. 
accept an EU-wide solution regarding the CSI and customs security. 
Firstly, the Commission initiated legal action starting an infringement 
procedure in the European Court of Justice against the member states 
that joined the CSI and signed memorandums with the U.S.82 Through 
this action the Commission wanted to ensure and safeguard the Union’s 
political coherency and consistency; this in turn would send a signal to the 
U.S. about the EU’s concerns and about the real possibility that the 
European Court of Justice could render the bilateral deals illegal since 
these deals violated the EU law and treaties.83 Secondly, the Commission 
framed the EU-U.S. clash not only in terms of competencies and legality 
but also in terms of efficiency; the argument that the Commission officials 
were advancing in their talks with their U.S. counterparts was that the 
U.S. aims could be achieved in a more efficient way at an EU level.84 An 
EU-wide agreement would ensure for example that all EU ports had the 
same risk assessment and screening criteria, and this in turn would be 
beneficial from both a security and an industry perspective.85 In other 
words, the Commission officials did not only use threats (structural 
leadership) but also pointed to common benefits (entrepreneurial 
leadership). 
 
The U.S. officials realized gradually that the EU Commission had 
competencies for issues related to the CSI; hence they could not bypass 
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the Commission on that matter as they tried to do initially.86 This 
realization illustrates how even strong actors cannot fully control the issue 
of the participants in regime formation negotiations.87 Additionally, the 
Commission’s legal action against member states played a role in 
changing the U.S. stance.88 Indeed, a U.S. Customs spokesman admitted 
that the Commission’s legal action “could slow the agency's [U.S. 
Customs] plans to expand the CSI to more European ports by deterring 
countries from completing security agreements with the U.S.”89 In other 
words, the U.S. changed its position under the threat of the political costs 
it would otherwise incur. The Commission managed therefore to 
transform the bilateral approach of the U.S. into a regime formation 
process that would take place at an EU level. 
 
After the U.S. accepted the EU as its main interlocutor on customs 
security and CSI issues the Council of the EU gave a negotiation mandate 
to the Commission, and negotiations between the two sides started on 
March 2003. The negotiations were concluded very quickly (on November 
2003), as no major differences emerged on the content of the 
agreement.90 The EU and the U.S. agreed on the guiding principles for 
customs security: multi-layered risk management, trade facilitation, and 
international co-operation.91 These principles were essentially those 
included in the CSI and the bilateral memorandums with member states. 
Regarding the decision-making procedures of the regime, the agreement 
established a working group which would examine and make 
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recommendations on a number of priority issues related to customs 
security. 
 
 
The agreement between the EU and the U.S. was finally signed on 28 
April 2004.92 The scope of the deal was not limited to issues related to the 
CSI, and it went beyond what was previously agreed on the U.S.-member 
states memorandums: the EU aimed and managed to include in the scope 
of the agreement broader issues related to customs security.93 Such 
issues included the exchange of best practices in the field of customs 
security and the establishment of minimum standards for risk-
management programs, for the identification of high-risk shipments, for 
the screening of high-risk cargos, and for industry-partnership 
programs.94  
 
To summarize, customs functions were re-conceptualized in the post-9/11 
security environment, acquiring an anti-terrorist role. The U.S. moved 
first, initiating the regime formation process through the exercise of 
structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership. While the 
European Commission shared the concerns of the U.S., it sought the 
conclusion of a deal at the EU level. The 2004 agreement that was finally 
concluded reflected the common interests and principles of the EU and 
the U.S. in the issue-area of customs security. 
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The mutual recognition decision 
 
Part of the U.S. plans for customs security was the launch and expansion 
of the C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) program. 
The C-TPAT program was based on the idea that the private sector should 
be taken into account in the establishment and implementation of security 
measures. Accounting for the private sector was natural given the large 
role played in the international supply chains system by private actors 
and companies, such as importers, shippers, and customs brokers.95 The 
involvement of the private sector in supply chain security was especially 
crucial in the context of the customs security gaps that were identified 
after the 9/11 attacks.  
 
The U.S. C-TPAT program was launched in 2001 and was authorized in 
2006 with the “Security and Accountability for Every Port Act” of 2006.96 
Through this program, U.S.-based companies which were involved in 
importing goods from overseas could voluntarily adopt a number of 
security measures. In return, U.S. Customs would offer these companies 
a number of benefits, such as faster security clearances and less security 
inspections. The similar concept of Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) 
was adopted by the World Customs Organization (WCO) in the 
organization’s 2005 “SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and 
Facilitate Global Trade.”97 Finally, the EU, inspired by both the American 
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C-TPAT and the WCO standards, initiated in 2005 its own Authorized 
Economic Operator program.98 
 
A particular issue that the WCO highlighted was the mutual recognition of 
the various AEO systems. In other words, the WCO stressed that customs 
authorities and governments should recognize each other’s systems and 
security measures regarding AEOs as equivalent, and therefore grant the 
same benefits on those AEOs.99 This process of mutual recognition would 
be especially beneficial for industry, given that companies could benefit 
from a broadened array of trade facilitation measures.100 
 
Taking into account WCO’s SAFE Framework, the European Commission 
proposed the opening of talks with the U.S. in 2005 to achieve mutual 
recognition of the two sides’ programs for authorized companies.101 In 
this way, the Commission officials exercised a form of entrepreneurial 
leadership popularizing and drawing attention to the issue of mutual 
recognition. At the same time, the Commission promoted and favored a 
particular form of this recognition process, framing the problem as an EU-
U.S. issue rather than as an issue for member states to coordinate 
separately with the U.S. The Commission was pointing to the benefits that 
the mutual recognition would bring about in both the EU and the U.S.   
 
By initiating talks for the mutual recognition of the European AEO and the 
American C-TPAT, the Commission took the lead in the EU-U.S. regime 
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formation process. This alone was a significant development, given that 
the EU was frequently portrayed in the literature as being led by the U.S. 
on security issues. However, it was only in 2007 that the U.S. agreed to 
engage in talks with Europeans about the feasibility of an EU-U.S. mutual 
recognition; the two sides decided in January 2007 to create a working 
group. The aim of the group was to devise a roadmap toward mutual 
recognition, and the drafting of proposals and suggestions for an EU-U.S. 
agreement thereon.102 Despite the creation of this group, U.S. support for 
such an agreement remained lukewarm until at least 2008 and early 
2009.103 
 
The main reason behind U.S. reluctance and the principal obstacle to the 
further development of the EU-U.S. customs security regime was again an 
initial American insistence on working with member states rather than 
with the EU as a whole. The U.S. preferred to recognize the business-to-
government programs of only certain countries, for example, Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom.104 The U.S. was reluctant to recognize 
the AEO programs of the new eastern European member states, whose 
customs security measures it did not fully trust.105 Additionally, the U.S. 
insisted that there was no point in having substantial discussions with the 
Commission on the issue of mutual recognition until the EU’s AEO 
program was implemented and fully functional and until the EU ensured 
that the AEO scheme was applied equally in all member states.106 In 2007 
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some EU member states still had yet to implement the relevant 
regulations of the AEO plan, despite its having been launched in 2005.107  
 
For the European Commission, however, a bilateral approach was a “red 
line” and it could not, therefore, be accepted.108 Similarly with the CSI, 
the selective recognition of the AEOs of only some countries would create 
trade distortions for the EU internal market, given that the AEOs of those 
countries would be in an advantageous position compared with other 
AEOs. Additionally, U.S. bilateralism clashed with the EU competencies on 
customs.109 
 
Both sides agreed on the norm of the mutual recognition of standards for 
the customs security business-to-government programs. The point of 
contention was whether this norm would be applied to all EU member 
states or only to some of them and whether the European Commission 
would have any voice in this process. In other words, similarly with the 
CSI case, the main point of contention was the form that transatlantic 
customs cooperation would take rather the principles and norms of this 
cooperation.110 
 
The breakthrough came with the start of the implementation of the EU’s 
AEO scheme on 1 January 2008. This satisfied the U.S. demand that the 
EU’s AEO should become operational before the EU-U.S. recognition 
process started. The two sides agreed as a result on March 2008 on a 
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“Roadmap towards Mutual Recognition of Trade Partnership Programs”.111 
This document was crucial as it “set the way forward” for mutual 
recognition by identifying the steps that the EU and the U.S. had to take 
to achieve this aim.112  
 
The recognition roadmap included a number of technical, operational, 
legal, and evaluation areas of action that needed completion for 
recognition to be achieved. Such areas included, for example, the data 
elements that customs authorities would exchange and the proper legal 
framework for the implementation of recognition.  
 
The Mutual Recognition decision was finally signed on 4 May 2012, and 
full implementation started on 31 January 2013.113 The initiative for this 
agreement came from the European Commission, which in this way 
played an important role in shaping the agenda of the EU-U.S. customs 
security cooperation. More importantly, the mutual recognition decision 
served as a catalyst for a change in the American C-TPAT program and 
this in turn points towards a process where the U.S. was partially 
influenced by the EU and adopted EU standards.  
 
When the C-TPAT was established it covered only companies which 
imported goods from overseas to the U.S.; in other words, C-TPAT 
covered U.S. importers. On the contrary, the EU’s AEO program had both 
an imports and an exports aspect. When the mutual recognition process 
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started an important element in the EU-U.S. talks was that of the 
reciprocity of the final agreement;114 for the final mutual recognition 
decision to be reciprocal the U.S. had to expand C-TPAT to exporters and, 
indeed, such an expansion was included in the EU-U.S. recognition road 
map.115 Following the adoption of the road map, the U.S. Customs started 
planning the expansion of C-TPAT to exporters in 2013.116  
 
The mutual recognition case was also an example of the potential linkages 
between the internal coherency of the EU and the regime formation 
process of the EU with the U.S. Indeed, the refusal of the U.S. to enter 
into substantive talks with the Commission on mutual recognition until the 
EU’s authorized operators plan was fully functional in all member states 
points towards the existence of such connections. According to the EU 
officials interviewed, U.S. bilateralism could be neutralized if the EU 
member states stood loyal to the EU policies.117 The more consistent and 
coherent the EU was internally the more credible it appeared to the U.S., 
and the EU’s credibility, in turn, affected U.S. calculations. 
  
 
The 100% scanning rule 
 
The emergence of the transatlantic customs security regime was not 
without problems. This section presents the 100% scanning issue, which 
emerged through an initiative of the U.S. Congress, as an example of how 
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political contextual factors can influence processes of regime formation. 
The European Commission officials were opposed to this measure and 
tried to dissuade the U.S. officials from implementing it through a 
combination of threats (structural leadership) and a persuasion campaign 
(intellectual leadership). 
 
In 2006 the U.S. Congress passed the “Security and Accountability for 
Every Port Act.”118 Among other measures, the act instructed the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security to test the feasibility of scanning all 
U.S.-bound containers in foreign ports for nuclear and radiological 
materials. This testing was initiated in December 2006 with the Secure 
Freight Initiative (SFI) that was implemented in three ports (Southampton 
in the United Kingdom, Port Qasim in Pakistan, and Puerto Cortes in 
Honduras).119 In 2007, however, the new Democratic Congress passed 
the so-called 9/11 Commission Act which, among other things, amended 
the 2006 act.120 The Congress legislated that by 2012 all U.S.-bound 
cargo should be scanned with radiological and nuclear detection 
equipment at overseas ports; otherwise, the shipping vessels would be 
prohibited from entering the U.S.  
 
The 100% scanning requirement was another extraterritorial and 
unilateral measure along the lines of the 24h rule. The 100% scanning 
legislation did not, however, have the full support of the U.S. 
administration and the Department of Homeland Security; rather, it was a 
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politically motivated initiative of the Congress.121 In particular, the new 
Democratic Congress wanted to demonstrate through its first act (the 
9/11 Commission Act) that it was as committed to the security of the U.S. 
as the Republican administration.122 Additionally, the 9/11 Commission 
Act served the purpose of criticizing the Republican Bush administration 
for shortcomings in the area of homeland security.123  
 
The European Commission was fiercely opposed to such a measure for a 
number of reasons: in particular, the Commission conducted three 
technical studies to examine the impact of the 100% rule with regard to 
trade, maritime transport, and security.124 These studies formed the basis 
of the Commission officials’ intellectual campaign, in which they tried to 
persuade their U.S. counterparts about the huge costs and disadvantages 
that 100% scanning would have. Firstly, according to these studies, the 
100% scanning rule would have huge investment and operational costs 
for European countries.125 European ports would have to spend money on 
new equipment and technology, on changing their procedures and 
regulations, and on expanding their facilities. Regarding operational costs, 
the implementation of the 100% rule would require an increase in port 
personnel while maintenance and energy consumption costs would 
increase too.126 Secondly, according to the Commission, the 100% 
scanning rule would disrupt the EU-U.S. maritime transport and trade 
given that the direct and indirect transport costs of containers would 
increase.127 Additionally, there would be trade distortions in the EU 
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internal market since small ports would not be able to invest in the 
necessary equipment and therefore they would lose the U.S.-related part 
of their business. Thirdly, the 100% rule would also affect other sectors of 
the economy: the increased transport costs would be transferred to the 
prices of the final products, affecting consumers’ purchasing capacity. 
Finally, according to the Commission reports, the 100% rule would not 
improve security: especially for the EU, implementation of the 100% 
legislation would incur huge opportunity costs given that scarce resources 
and personnel in European customs authorities would be diverted from 
their projects into trying to implement the U.S. legislation.128  
 
More broadly, the U.S. measure departed from the principle of multi-
layered risk management according to which containers would be 
screened on the basis of risk criteria and only the high risk containers 
would be scanned. This principle formed the basis of the U.S. and EU 
approach to customs security, as was shown previously. It was a principle 
that was also shared by the international community in general, especially 
through the initiatives of the WCO.129 The 100% rule created the 
possibility of having globally diverging and incompatible standards for 
customs security, which in turn would cause trade disruptions and losses. 
 
The Commission officials used the above arguments as the basis for an 
intellectual campaign which aimed to influence the U.S. Congress and to 
promote the alternative customs security model of risk-management. In 
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particular, the EU Commission sent its reports and studies regarding the 
100% rule to the Department of Homeland Security, in order for the latter 
to present these studies to the U.S. Congress.130 Indeed, in a Senate 
Hearing on the 100% rule the U.S. administration presented the 
Commission’s view on the issue along with the views of the WCO and the 
industry; the U.S. officials themselves expressed in this hearing their 
concern about the feasibility of the rule.131 At the same time, the 
Commission officials exercised intellectual leadership on a second front, 
arguing against the 100% rule in the context of the WCO.132 
 
Apart from the above action, the Commission officials also exercised a 
form of structural leadership, raising threats to the U.S. in two areas. 
Firstly, the Commission made clear that the possibility of initiating legal 
action against the U.S. in the context of the World Trade Organization 
was open:133 according to the EU Commissioner for Taxation and Customs 
Kovács, the 100% rule “might pave the way for an EU complaint with the 
World Trade Organization that the U.S. has violated the international rules 
of free and fair trade.”134 Secondly, the Commission left open the 
possibility of demanding reciprocal measures from the U.S. on customs 
security, for which the U.S. was not ready.135 According to Commissioner 
Kovács, “following the logic of international trade, if any major player 
introduces measures unilaterally, it could be followed by reciprocal 
measures.”136 
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The Commission threats of legal action against a U.S. security measure 
give a picture of an EU as a more assertive actor than is normally 
assumed in the literature. This assertiveness was related to the fact that 
the EU had a strong strategic position in the area of trade and economy 
and therefore the Commission could capitalize on this area of strength to 
bring bargaining leverage into the talks with the U.S. Additionally, the 
strategic position of the EU was strengthened by the fact that the 
shipping industry opposed the 100% rule and started pressuring the U.S. 
Congress to change its stance. For example, in April 2007 two business 
groups (U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Business Europe) which 
represented the vast majority of the companies involved in transatlantic 
trade wrote to the U.S. Senate calling for the removal of the 100% 
scanning legislation.137  
 
The 100% rule was never implemented. The relevant legislation gave the 
Department of Homeland Security the authority to extend the July 2012 
deadline for the start of the program set by the 9/11 Commission Act. By 
2012 the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security made clear 
that it did not intend to implement the 100% rule, and it extended the 
deadline by two years.138 The U.S. officials remained evidently committed 
to the previous approach based on the principle of risk-management.139 
This approach was a core element of the U.S. National Strategy for Global 
Supply Chain Security published in 2012, in which there was no mention 
of the 100% scanning requirement. 
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Conclusions 
 
This article traced the emergence of the EU-U.S. customs security regime, 
employing a regime theory conceptual framework. This regime is based 
on the 2004 customs security agreement and the 2012 mutual recognition 
decision and on the principles of multi-layered risk management, 
international co-operation, and trade facilitation. 
 
The regime emerged mainly through a process of institutional bargaining 
based on common interests which the EU and the U.S. aimed to fulfill. In 
this sense, we cannot talk of a U.S.-imposed regime. While it is true that 
the initiative was at the beginning taken by the U.S., the European 
Commission subsequently showed initiative and had a proactive role, 
proposing, for instance, the mutual recognition and threatening to 
undermine the U.S. CSI through legal action against member states. In 
the first two cases the main point of contention was not the customs 
security norms and principles but rather the form that transatlantic 
customs cooperation would take. 
 
Additionally, the findings of this article confirm previous findings that 
instances of pure imposition are rare in global politics and that in regime 
formation processes all three social factors of power, interests, and 
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knowledge are important.140 In the cases examined here, the role of 
knowledge was especially important in the early agenda-formation stage, 
when the 9/11 crisis initiated a learning process among EU and U.S. 
actors and the U.S. officials converged around the idea of smart borders. 
Power (in the form of threats) and interests (in the form of side-payments 
and entrepreneurial leadership) were more important subsequently. 
 
Compared with other cases of EU-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation, such 
as the EU-U.S. PNR agreements, the mutual legal assistance and 
extradition agreements, and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
(TFTP) agreement, the EU-U.S. customs security talks and negotiations 
were less contentious. This was partly due to the fact that data protection 
was not a significant issue in customs security. Data protection issues and 
concerns were directly relevant for the EU-U.S. counterterrorism 
agreements mentioned previously, and the transatlantic differences on 
data protection made the negotiations for these agreements difficult. As 
of October 2015, the EU and the U.S. are on the final stages of concluding 
a “Data Protection Umbrella Agreement” which will cover all transfers of 
personal data between the EU and the U.S. for law enforcement purposes. 
Such an agreement will make transatlantic law enforcement and 
counterterrorism cooperation easier, removing one of the main 
impediments to this cooperation. 
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The importance of the EU-U.S. customs cooperation moves beyond the 
two actors’ bilateral relations. The security measures and standards that 
the EU and the U.S. negotiated and adopted could potentially serve as 
international models and be exported globally in the form of international 
standards. Given that the EU and its member states and the U.S. are the 
biggest and most influential actors in the field of internal security and 
counterterrorism, they could adopt a leadership role by engaging more 
actively with third states and international organizations. Through the 
combined weight of the EU and the U.S. states with lagging standards 
could be persuaded to implement counterterrorism instruments and 
measures adopted by the United Nations or other organizations. Therefore 
a potential area of further research is the export of global standards by 
the EU and the U.S. in the area of customs security. Questions that could 
be examined are to what extent the two sides cooperate and coordinate 
their positions in international and multilateral forums such as the World 
Customs Organization or the United Nations, or to what extent the 
adoption of U.S. rules by the EU legitimizes these rules and facilitates 
their adoption by third countries. 
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